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I. INTRODUCTION 
On August 2, 1990, after midnight, Iraq's armed forces crossed 
into Kuwait, moved toward Kuwait's capital and within seven hours 
occupied it. 1 The United States, Britain and France immediately con-
demned the Iraqi invasion, called for the immediate and uncondi-
tional withdrawal of all Iraqi troops from Kuwait and froze all Iraqi 
and Kuwaiti assets in their respective countries. 2 They also an-
nounced the immediate halting of all arms shipments to Iraq. 3 The 
Soviet Union, Iraq's main arms supplier, followed suit, halting all So-
viet arms sales to Iraq, and called on the Iraqi government to with-
draw all of its troops, unconditionally and immediately, from 
Kuwait.4 
Iraq did not show any serious inclination to withdraw its military 
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College and a J.D. from Cornell University Law School. 
1. See Michael R. Gordon, Iraq Army Invades Capital of Kuwait in Fierce Fighting, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 2, 1990, at Al. See also THE MIDDLE EAST 355-56 (Daniel c. Diller ed., 7th ed. 
1991) (revised to include a Persian Gulf Crisis Supplement, Congressional Quar-
terly)[hereinafter THE MIDDLE EAST 7th]. 
2. Barbara Toman, Several Countries Freeze Kuwait's Overseas Assets, WALL ST. J., Aug. 
3, 1990, at A4. See also THE MIDDLE EAST 7th, supra note 1, at 356. 
3. Clyde Haberman, The Iraqi Invasion, N.Y. TIMES, Aug 6, 1990, at§ 1. See also THE 
MIDDLE EAST 7th, supra note 1, at 356. 
4. See Ved P. Nanda, The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait: The U.N. Response, 15 S. ILL. U. 
L.J. 431 (1991). See also THE MIDDLE EAST 7th, supra note 1, at 356. 
1
Dallal: International Law and the United Nations' Role In the Gulf Crisis
Published by SURFACE, 1992
112 Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Com. [Vol. 18: 111 
forces from Kuwait. 5 On the same day, the United Nations Security 
Council, by a vote of fourteen to zero, with one member, Yemen, not 
participating in the vote, 6 passed Resolution 660 which condemned 
the Iraqi invasion, demanded Iraq's immediate and unconditional 
withdrawal and called upon Iraq and Kuwait to begin immediate ne-
gotiation of their dispute. 7 Iraq did not heed the Security Council's 
resolution. 8 
On August 3, 1990, the second day of Iraq's occupation of Ku-
wait, Soviet Foreign Minister Edward Shevardnadze and U.S. Secre-
tary of State James Baker jointly called for unconditional Iraqi 
withdrawal from Kuwait. Pending that request, they urged the inter-
national community to halt all arms deliveries to Iraq. 9 On August 4, 
the European Community froze all Iraqi and Kuwati assets. 10 
On August 5, 1990, U.S. President George Bush declared that 
nothing short of Iraq's total withdrawal from Kuwait would be ac-
ceptable to the U.S. 11 On August 6, the U.S. began a massive deploy-
ment of warplanes and troops to Saudi Arabia, 12 reiterating that 
Iraq's occupation of Kuwait would not stand. 13 
In response, Iraqi troops began to round up hundreds of U.S. and 
other Western civilians in Kuwait and Iraq on August 6 and 7. 14 Af-
ter an urgent meeting between King Fahd of Saudi Arabia and U.S. 
Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney, 15 Saudi Arabia invited the U.S. 
to send its forces into Saudi Arabia. 16 Operation Desert Shield was 
then expanded, with the United States, Britain, France and even the 
U.S.S.R. sending war ships to the Persian Gulf. 17 The U.N. Security 
5. Not only did Iraq refuse to withdraw from Kuwait, Iraq in fact annexed Kuwait, 
claiming it to be an integral part of Iraq. See Paul Lewis, U.N. Council Declares Void Iraqi 
Annexation of Kuwait, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 1990, at Al 1. See also THE MIDDLE EAST 7th, 
supra note 1, at 356. 
6. See Nanda, supra note 4, at 435. See also THE MIDDLE EAST 7th, supra note 1, at.356. 
7. S.C. Res. 660, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2932d mtg. (Aug. 2, 1990) reprinted in 29 
l.L.M. 1325 (1990) [hereinafter s.c. Res. 660]. See also ACCESS GUIDE TO THE PERSIAN 
GULF CRISIS, Jan. 1991, at 15 [hereinafter ACCESS]. 
8. See Lewis, supra note 5; THE MIDDLE EAST 7th, supra note 1, at 356. 
9. ACCESS, supra note 7, at 8; THE MIDDLE EAST 7th, supra note l, at 356. 
10. ACCESS, supra note 7, at 8; THE MIDDLE EAST 7th, supra note 1, at 356. 
11. ACCESS, supra note 7, at 8; THE MIDDLE EAST 7th, supra note l, at 356. 
12. See Andrew Rosenthal, Bush Sends U.S. Force to Saudi Arabia as Kingdom Agrees to 
Confront Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1990, at Al. See a/so THE MIDDLE EAST 7th, supra note 
1, at 356. 
13. See ACCESS, supra note 7, at 8. See also THE MIDDLE EAST 7th, supra note l, at 356. 
14. ACCESS, supra note 7, at 8. See also THE MIDDLE EAST 7th, supra note 1, at 356. 
15. See Rosenthal, supra note 12. See also THE MIDDLE EAST 7th, supra note 1, at 356. 
16. See Rosenthal, supra note 12. See also THE MIDDLE EAST 7th, supra note 1, at 356. 
17. Confrontation in the Gulf, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1990, at A5; Supporting the U.S. in 
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Council then passed Resolution 661, prohibiting all U.N. members 
from buying oil from, or having any commercial or financial dealings 
with Iraq and Kuwait. 18 
On August 8, 1990, Iraq formally annexed Kuwait, declaring it 
to be Iraq's nineteenth province. 19 Iraq also demanded that all foreign 
missions in Kuwait City be moved to Baghdad. 20 
Rejecting Iraq's annexation of Kuwait and defying its demand to 
move the U.S. Embassy in Kuwait to Baghdad, the U.S. called for a 
"multinational" force to join the U.S. troops it had deployed to Saudi 
Arabia and the Persian Gulf.21 In response to this invitation, the So-
viet Union announced that it would only join a U.N. force in the 
Gulf.22 
The U.S. government then outlined its policy objectives in the 
developing crisis as follows: (1) the unconditional withdrawal of all 
Iraqi troops from Kuwait; (2) the restoration of the legitimate govern-
ment of Kuwait; and (3) the protection of U.S. citizens and the main-
tenance of security in the Persian Gulf. 23 
On August 9, 1990, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolu-
tion 662, which condemned Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and declared its 
annexation "illegal. "24 
On August 12, Iraq offered a "peace plan" to resolve "all issues 
of occupation" in the Middle East, including Israel's occupation of 
the West Bank, Gaza and the Golan Heights, as well as Syria's occu-
the Gulf, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1990, at A12; James LeMoyne, The World, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
21, 1990, § 4, at 2 (almost 200,000 troops from a dozen countries and 100 ships from 14 
countries were assembled). See also Michael McQueen & John J. Fialka, White House An-
nounces New Deployment in Gulf, WALL ST. J., Nov. 9, 1990, at A3 (a new deployment of U.S. 
forces, almost doubling the already deployed forces of nearly 230,000 U.S. troops in the region, 
was contemplated). 
18. S.C. Res. 661, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2933d mtg. (Aug. 6, 1990) reprinted in 29 
l.L.M. 1325 (1990) [hereinafter S.C. Res. 661). See also ACCESS, supra note 7, at 15. 
19. See Lewis, supra note 5. Iraq's representative to the U.N. described the annexation of 
Kuwait as an attempt to end the "splintering of the region" brought about by colonial powers 
which had "transformed the Arab nation into 22 Arab states, redrawing the map of the re-
gion." He also described the annexation of Kuwait as an act of reunifying Iraq. Id. 
20. ACCESS, supra note 7, at 8; THE MIDDLE EAST 7th, supra note 1, at 356. 
21. ACCESS, supra note 7, at 8. On August 9, 1990, in response to Iraq's declaration of a 
"comprehensive and eternal merger" with Kuwait, the United Nations Security Council reaf-
firmed its position, demanding Iraq's immediate and unconditional withdrawal, and declaring 
Iraq's "annexation" of Kuwait to be illegal, null and void. See S.C. Res. 662, U.N. SCOR, 
45th Sess., 2934th mtg.(Aug. 9, 1990) reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1327 (1990)[hereinafter S.C. Res. 
662). See also ACCESS, supra note 7, at 15. 
22. ACCESS, supra note 7, at 8. See also Nanda, supra note 4, at 440-41. 
23. ACCESS, supra note 7, at 8. 
24. S.C. Res. 662, supra note 21. 
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pation of Lebanon.25 The U.S. government rejected the Iraqi offer, 
calling the inclusion of other occupations an unacceptable 
"linkage. " 26 
On August 18, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 664, 
which called on Iraq to release all the foreign nationals it had de-
tained in Iraq and Kuwait. 27 
On August 25, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 665, 
authorizing the use of all "necessary measures" to enforce the eco-
nomic sanctions against Iraq.28 On September 26, it passed Resolu-
tion 670, which expanded the economic sanctions against Iraq and 
barred passenger and cargo traffic to and from Iraq, except for hu-
manitarian purposes.29 On October 29, 1990, it passed Resolution 
674, which demanded that Iraq stop detaining foreign nationals.3° Fi-
nally, on November 29, 1990, it adopted Resolution 678, which au-
thorized the use of "all necessary means" to make Iraq comply with 
all previous Security Council resolutions by January 15, 1991. 31 
On January 12, 1991, the U.S. Congress authorized President 
25. ACCESS, supra note 7, at 9. See also Proposal by Iraqi President, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
13, 1990, at A6. 
26. ACCESS, supra note 7, at 9. 
27. S.C. Res. 664, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2937th mtg. (Aug. 18, 1990) reprinted in 29 
1.L.M. 1328 (1990)[hereinafter S.C. Res. 664). See also ACCESS, supra note 7, at 15. The 
Security Council demanded "that Iraq permit and facilitate the immediate departure from 
Kuwait and Iraq of the nationals of third countries" and that "Iraq take no action to jeopard-
ize the safety, security or health of such nationals." Id. 
28. S.C. Res. 665, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2938th mtg. (Aug. 25, 1990) reprinted in 29 
l.L.M. 1329 (1990)[hereinafter S.C. Res. 665). Security Council Resolution 665 called upon 
those Member States co-operating with the Government of Kuwait which are deploying mari-
time forces to the area to use such measures commensurate to the specific circumstances as 
may be necessary under the authority of the Security Council to halt all inward and outward 
maritime shipping in order to inspect and verify their cargoes and destinations and to insure 
strict implementation of the provisions relating to such shipping laid down in S.C. Res. 661. 
See also ACCESS, supra note 7, at 15. 
29. S.C. Res. 670, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2943d mtg. (Sept. 25, 1990) reprinted in 29 
l.L.M. 1334 (1990)[hereinafter S.C. Res. 670). See also ACCESS, supra note 7, at 16. Security 
Council Resolution 670 provided that "all states . . . shall deny permission to any aircraft to 
take off from their territory if the aircraft would carry cargo to or from Iraq or Kuwait other 
than food in humanitarian circumstances . . . . " 
30. ACCESS, supra note 7, at 16. See also THE MIDDLE EAST 7th, supra note 1, at 366. 
31. S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2963d mtg. (Nov. 29, 1990) reprinted in 29 
l.L.M. 1565 (1990) [hereinafter S.C. Res. 678). See also ACCESS, supra note 7, at 16. In 
Resolution 678 the Security Council demanded that Iraq comply fully with Resolution 660 
and all subsequent relevant resolutions, and decided while maintaining all its decisions, to 
allow Iraq one final opportunity, as a pause of goodwill, to do so; "[and] authorizes Member 
States co-operating with the Government of Kuwait, unless Iraq on or before 15 January 1991 
fully implements ... the foregoing resolutions, to use all necessary means to uphold and imple-
ment Resolution 660 and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace 
and security to the area." 
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Bush to implement U.N. Security Council Resolution 67832 and on 
January 16, the President ordered air attacks by the allied forces 
against Iraq. 33 
In light of the above events, this article will examine the histori-
cal background which precipitated Iraq's invasion, occupation and 
annexation of Kuwait. It will also examine the political and legal as-
pects of the U.N. Security Council's resolutions pertaining to Iraq's 
actions against Kuwait. Finally, it will examine the legitimacy in in-
ternational law of the use of force against Iraq by the U.S. and its 
coalition partners. 
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
While it may seem difficult to defend Iraq's use of force against 
the Sheikhdom of Kuwait, 34 an independent sovereign state35 and a 
member state of the United Nations36 as well as of the Arab League,37 
with whom Iraq had had diplomatic relations, 38 it is important to un-
derstand the underlying tensions which led to the outbreak of hostili-
ties on August 2, 1990.39 For almost a century, Iraq has maintained 
that Kuwait40 is an integral part of Iraq and that Kuwait therefore 
32. See Adam Clymer, Congress Acts to Authorize War in Gulf, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 
1991, § 1, at 2. See also THE MIDDLE EAST 7th, supra note 1, at 363. 
33. See Michael R. Gordon, War in the Gulf, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 1991, at Al. 
34. Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter provides: "All members shall refrain in their inter-
national relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United 
Nations." U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4. 
35. Kuwait attained full independence from Great Britain on June 19, 1961. See 
HUMPHREY TREVELYAN, THE MIDDLE EAST IN REVOLUTION 186-91 (1970). 
36. See THE PERSIAN GULF STATES 175, 179 (Alvin J. Cottrell ed., 1980). Although 
Kuwait gained its independence from Great Britain in 1961, its admission to the U.N. was 
initially blocked by the Soviet Union, which sympathized with Iraq's contention that Kuwait 
was part of the Iraqi Province of Basra and had been stolen from the Ottomans during their 
rule of Iraq by Great Britain. When, in 1963, Iraq dropped its claim to Kuwait, the Soviets 
dropped their opposition and Kuwait gained admission to the U.N. on May 7, 1963. See id. 
37. Kuwait was admitted to membership in the Arab League on July 20, 1961. Id. at 
179. 
38. Iraq recognized Kuwait in 1963, after the overthrow of the Iraqi regime of Abdul-
Karim Qasim and after Iraq dropped its claim to Kuwait. Id. at 67, 175. 
39. See Shaw J. Dallal, Has the U.S. Been Wise?, MIDDLE EAST INT'L, Oct. 12, 1990, at 
20-21. 
40. The name "Kuwait" is the Arabic diminutive of "Kut," a Portugese word meaning a 
small fort, which crept into the Arabic language. There were two small settlements of Iraqi 
Bedouins in the Province of Basra, one around Kut, which was a major Ottomon fort, and the 
other around Kuwait, which was a smaller fort. In the early 18th century, after a harsh 
drought in the desert in 1710, a small group of Bedouins migrated from Najd to the Basra area 
in Iraq in search of water. They settled around the small fort known as Kuwait where there 
was a Turkish garrison. The Bedouins' chieftain, named Al-Sabah, sought permission from 
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should not have been carved out of the Iraqi Province of Basra by 
Great Britain while Iraq was under Ottoman rule.41 
In 1899, Great Britain made a deal with a Bedouin Chieftain, 
Sheikh Mubarak Al-Sabah, who had "murdered his way to the 
Sheikhdom" shortly before the tum of the Twentieth Century. 42 
Great Britain's deal with the Bedouin Chieftain was motivated by its 
desire to prevent the German Kaiser, Wilhelm II, from building the 
terminus of the Berlin-Baghdad railway, which would expand to the 
then small and obscure Iraqi port of Kuwait on the Persian Gulf, 
thereby jeopardizing Britain's access to India.43 
After some discussions with Sheikh Mubarak Al-Sabah, Great 
Britain concluded a secret agreement with him which provided for 
British control of foreign affairs and non-alienation of the Bedouin 
settlement in and around the port of Kuwait. In effect, an informal 
protectorate Shiekhdom was established and the desolate Iraqi port of 
Kuwait, seemingly, had quietly passed from the Ottoman sphere of 
influence to that of Great Britain, thereby sowing the seeds of conflict 
over the fate of that territory. The secret agreement provided: 
The object of writing this lawful and honourable bond is that it is 
hereby covenanted and agreed between Lieutenant - Colonel Mal-
colm John Meade, l.S.C., Her Britannic Majesty's Political Resident, 
on behalf of the British Government on the one part, and Sheikh 
Mubarak-bin-Sheikh Subah, Sheikh of Koweit, on the other part, 
that the said Sheikh Mubarak-bin-Sheikh Subah of his own free will 
and desire does hereby pledge and bind himself, his heirs and succes-
sors not to receive the Agent or Representative of any Power or Gov-
ernment at Koweit, or at any other place within the limits of his 
territory, without the previous sanction of the British Government; 
the Turkish commander to stay put. The commander granted the Bedouin chieftain permis-
sion. The Al-Sabah family has been in and around Kuwait ever since. See THE MIDDLE EAST 
191 (Michael D. Wormser ed., 5th ed. 1981). 
41. Relations between Great Britain and Kuwait actually go back to 1775, when for a 
brief period, with the consent of the Ottoman authorities, the British Government used the 
main port of that Iraqi desert territory, which was part of the Province of Basra, as a station on 
an overland mail service from India to the Mediterranean. However, Great Britain repeatedly 
turned down requests by various Bedouin chieftains in and around Kuwait and Kut for coop-
eration with Great Britain and protection from the oppressive Ottoman rule. See J.C. 
HUREWITZ, DOCUMENTS OF NEAR EAST DIPLOMATIC HISTORY 127 (1951). 
42. After murdering his half brother, Sheikh Mubarak Al-Sabah sought protection from 
Great Britain, fearing his own people who resented his ascension to power and fearing punish-
ment from the Turks who wanted their authority to be effective. See THE PERSIAN GULF 
STATES, supra note 36, at 57-58. See also ALAN VILLIERS, SONS OF SINBAD 381 (1969). 
43. See Ghada Talhami, The Ideology of Arab Nationalism and The Persian Gulf Crisis, 
15 s. ILL. u. L.J. 511 (1991). See also BRITON c. BUSCH, BRITAIN AND THE PERSIAN GULF, 
1884-1914, 330-47 (1967); PHILIP GRAVES, LIFE OF SIR PERCY Cox 168-70 (1941). 
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and he further binds himself, his heirs and successors not to cede, 
sell, lease, mortgage, or give for occupation or for any other purpose 
any portion of his territory to the Government or subjects of any 
other Power without the previous consent of Her Majesty's Govern-
ment for these purposes. This engagement also to extend to any por-
tion of the territory of the said Sheikh Mubarak, which may now be 
in the possession of the subjects of any other Government. 44 
On July 29, 1913, still opposed to the German-Turkish program 
of constructing the Baghdad railway,4s Great Britain entered into a 
convention with Turkey regarding the Persian Gulf. The convention 
provided: 
Kuwait: 
Article 1: The territory of Kuwait, as it is defined by Articles 5 and 7 
of this Convention, shall form an area which is autonomous from the 
Ottoman Empire. 
Article 2: The Sheikh of Kuwait shall display, as in the past, an Ot-
toman flag, with, if so desired, the word 'Kuwait' written in the cor-
ner, and he shall enjoy a total administrative autonomy in the 
territorial zone defined by Article 5 of this Convention. The Imperial 
Ottoman Government shall abstain from all interference in the affairs 
of Kuwait, including the question of succession, and all administra-
tive acts, as well as any occupation, or military acts, in the described 
territories. In case of vacancy, the Imperial Ottoman Government 
shall name a Successor, by Imperial Decree, to succeed the deceased 
Sheikh. It shall also have the option to name a delegate to the Sheikh 
to protect the interests and the natives of other parts of the Empire. 
Article 3: The Imperial Ottoman Government shall recognize the 
validity of the agreements which the Sheikh of Kuwait has previously 
concluded with the Government of His Britannic Majesty .... 
Article 4: In order to confirm the Agreement already entered into 
between the two governments, by the promises exchanged on Septem-
ber 6, 1901, between the Embassy of His Britannic Majesty in Con-
stantinople and the Imperial Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the 
Government of His Britannic Majesty declares that as long as no 
changes are made by the Imperial Ottoman Government to the status 
of Kuwait, as it is defined in this Convention, the Government of His 
Britannic Majesty shall not change the nature of its relations with the 
Government of Kuwait, and shall not establish a protectorate on the 
territory which has been given to it. The Imperial Ottoman Govern-
ment formally records this declaration. 
44. C.U. AITCHISON, A COLLECTION OF TREATIES, ENGAGEMENTS AND SANADS RE-
LATING TO INDIA AND NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES 262 (5th ed. 1933). 
45. See Talhami, supra note 43; BUSCH, supra note 43; GRAVES, supra note 43, at 170 -
72. 
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Article 8: In case of an agreement between the Imperial Ottoman 
Government and the Government of His Britannic Majesty allowing 
the establishment of a railway from Baghdad to Basra to the sea, with 
a terminal at Kuwait, or at any other part of the autonomous terri-
tory, then the two governments shall agree on the arrangements to be 
made with respect to guarding the line and the stations, as well as the 
setting up of custom houses, warehouses and any other auxiliary in-
stallations, which may be necessary to the railway. 
Article 9: The Sheikh of Kuwait shall enjoy, with full security, the 
rights of private property, to the properties he owns in the territory of 
the Province of Basra. He shall exercise these rights of private own-
ership in accordance with Ottoman law. The real estate affected shall 
be subject to taxes and fees, the method of conservation and transmis-
sion and the jurisdiction established by Ottoman law.46 
46. English text was translated by, Dr. Pasquale and Mrs. Jaqueline Ciaglia, from the 
following French text: 
I. - - Koueit 
ARTICLE ler. Le Territoire de Koueit, tel qu'il est delimite par les articles S et 7 de 
cette convention, forme un kaza autonome de l'Empire ottoman. 
ARTICLE 2. Le cheikh de Koueit arborera comme par le passe le drapeau ottoman, 
avec, s'il le desire, le mot "Koueit" inscrit au coin, et ii jouira d'une autonomic admin-
strative complete dans la zone territoriale definie a l'article S de cette convention. Le 
Gouvemement Imperial ottoman s'abstiendra de toute immixtion dans les affaires de 
Koueit, y compris la question de la succession, et de tout acte d'administration ainsi 
que de toute occupation et tout acte militaire, dans les territoires qui en font partie. En 
cas de vacance, le Gouvemement Imperial ottoman nommera kaimakam, par firman 
Imperial, le successeur du cheikh defunt. 11 aura aussi la faculte de nommer aupres du 
cheikh un commissaire pour proteger les interets et les indigenes des autres parties de 
l'Empire. 
ARTICLE 3. Le Gouvemement Imperial ottoman reconnait la validite des conven-
tions que le cheikh de Koueit a conclues precooemment avec le Gouvemement de Sa 
Majeste britannique . . . . 
ARTICLE 4. En vue de confirmer l'entente deja etablie entre les deux Gouvemements 
par les assurances echangees le 6 septembre 1901, entre l'ambassade de Sa Majeste 
britannique a Constantinople et le Ministere Imperial des affaires etrangeres, le 
Gouvemement de Sa Majeste britannique declare qu'en tant qu'aucun changement ne 
sera apporte par le Gouvemement Imperial ottoman au statu quo de Koueit, tel qu'il se 
trouve defini par la presente convention, ii ne changera en rien la nature de ses relations 
avec le Gouvemement de Koueit et n'etablira pas de protectorat sur le territoire qui lui 
est attribue. Le Gouvemement Imperial ottoman prend acte de cette declaration. 
ARTICLE 8. Dans le cas ou le Gouvemement Imperial ottoman s'entendrait avec le 
Gouvemement de Sa Majeste britannique pour faire aboutir la ligne ferree de Bagdad-
Basra a la mer au terminus de Koueit OU a tout autre terminus dans le territoire 
autonome, les deux Gouvemements s'entendront sur les dispositions a prendre 
touchant la garde de la ligne et des stations ainsi qui l'establissement de bureaux 
douaniers, dep0ts de marchandises et toute autre installation accessoire au service de la 
voie ferree. 
ARTICLE 9. Le cheikh de Koueit jouira en pleine securite des droits de propriete 
8
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It is the above convention, as well as the documents attached to 
it, all of which remained unratified,47 that Iraq, until this day, feels 
was entered into at its expense. 48 
Germany and Turkey, on the other hand, felt compelled to sign 
the Convention in order to give Great Britain the protection it sought 
in the Persian Gulf, thereby overcoming the diplomatic obstacle 
which Great Britain had mounted to the full execution of the Bagh-
dad railway project. 49 
When World War I broke out in 1914, however, and Turkey en-
tered the war on the side of the Central Powers, Great Britain imme-
diately recognized the desert Sheikhdom of Kuwait as an independent 
state under British protection. The British Political Resident in the 
Persian Gulf addressed a note to Sheikh Mubarak-Al-Sabah promis-
ing Great Britain's recognition of the complete severance of ties be-
tween the Sheikhdom of Kuwait and the Ottoman Empire in return 
for Sheikh Mubarak's support in the war against the Ottoman Em-
pire. The note provided: 
In continuation of previous letters intimating the out-break of war 
between the British Government and Turkey, I am ordered by the 
British Government to convey to Your Excellency gratitude for your 
loyalty and your offer of assistance, and to request you to attack 
Umm Qasr, Safwan and Bubiyan and to occupy them ... that the 
British Government does recognise and admit that the Shaikhdom 
[sic] of Kuwait is an independent Government under British protec-
tion ... . so 
In 1922, in the aftermath of World War I, Great Britain formally 
carved Kuwait out of the Iraqi Province of Basra, creating new bor-
ders for Iraq, thereby depriving it of an effective outlet to the sea.st 
privee qu'il possCde dans le territoire du vila-yet de Basra. Ces droits de propriete privee 
devront s'exercer en conformite de la loi ottomane et les biens immobiliers qu'ils con-
cement seront soumis aux imp0ts et charges, au mode de conservation et de transmis-
sion et a la jurisdiction establis par les lois ottomanes manes. 
10 GOOCH AND TEMPERELY' BRITISH DocUMENTS, part II, at 190-94, reprinted in 
HUREWITZ, supra note 41, at 146 - 47. 
47. See id. at 146. 
48. See Lewis, supra note 5. 
49. "We have only got two objects as regards the Baghdad Railway," explained British 
Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey to the British Committee of Imperial Defense on May 26, 
1911. "[O]ne is to secure that when that railway is made British trade shall not be at a disad-
vantage," and the other "is that the situation in the Persian Gulf ... should not be altered in a 
way which would damage our strategical [sic] position." HUREWITZ, supra note 41, at 146 
(citing BRITISH DocUMENTS Vol. VI at 786-87). 
50. For full text, see AITCHISON, supra note 44, at 265-66. 
51. In 1922, Great Britain, at Uqair, finalized Kuwait's frontiers, giving Saudi Arabia 
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In 1961, the rising financial cost of policing the Persian Gulf per-
suaded Great Britain to withdraw from the region, and to grant the 
now oil-rich Sheikhdom of Kuwait full independence. s2 Iraq immedi-
ately made its first serious military bid to recover Kuwait, claiming it 
to be an integral part of its historical territory, massing troops on Ku-
wait's borders and demanding its integration into Iraqi territory. On 
July 1 and 2, 1961, at the Sheikhdom's request, Great Britain intro-
duced 3,000 British troops to defend the Sheikhdom. Iraq, now fear-
ful of engaging the air, naval and land forces of Great Britain, and 
possibly of others, did not invade Kuwait. s3 
Then on September 10, 1961, the Arab League dispatched a sym-
bolic force of 3,000 men to defend Kuwait against possible future 
Iraqi attack. s4 When, in 1963, the Iraqi Government finally and for-
mally recognized the Sheikhdom as an independent state, ss that rec-
ognition seemed to put an end to Iraq's historic claim to Kuwait. s6 
Iraq, however, its formal recognition of the Sheikhdom notwithstand-
ing, continued to covet Kuwait and consider it a stolen territory of 
Iraq.s7 Border tensions between Iraq and the Sheikhdom of Kuwait 
two-thirds of the territory claimed by Kuwait under the unratified Anglo Ottoman Agreement 
of 1913 to compensate Saudi Arabia for surrendering part of its territory to Iraq, but still 
depriving Iraq of its natural outlet to the sea. See H.R.P. DICKSON, KUWAIT AND HER 
NEIGHBOURS 34S-S 1 (19S6). 
S2. See THE PERSIAN GULF STATES, supra note 36, at 9S. 
S3. See TREVELYAN, supra note 3S. 
S4. These troops were from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Republic which was made up 
of Egypt and Syria at that time, the Sudan, Jordan and Tunisia. They were under the com-
mand of a Saudi General. See THE PERSIAN GULF STATES, supra note 36, at 179. 
SS. Id. at 17S, 179. 
S6. Historically, W estem intervention in disputes between states in the Persian Gulf has 
frozen, rather than solved such disputes. Iraq may now be deterred from pressing its claim for 
Kuwait. Unless an honest effort is made to address Iraq's legitimate claim to Kuwait, how-
ever, there is an obvious possibility that Iraq may still seek a more violent solution in the not 
too distant future, thereby destabilizing the region further and endangering world peace. For a 
comprehensive study of the various territorial disputes of the Gulf region, see HUSAIN M. 
ALBAHARNA, THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE ARABIAN GULF STATES (1968). See also JOSEPH 
CHURBA, CONFLICT AND TENSION AMONG THE STATES OF THE PERSIAN GULF, OMAN AND 
SOUTH ARABIA (1971); J.B. KELLY, EASTERN ARABIAN FRONTIER (1964); and Majid Khad-
duri, Iran's Claim to the Sovereignty of Bahrain, 4S AM. J. INT'L L. 631 (19Sl). 
S1. Since Iraq laid claim to Kuwait on June 2S, 1961 and actively pursued that claim 
until deterred by Great Britain and the Arab League, the Iraqi claim was revived intermit-
tently, though on a modified basis, between 1961 and 1984. The 100 mile border between Iraq 
and Kuwait remained in dispute. In 1973, Iraqi forces briefly entered and occupied a Kuwaiti 
outpost along the border. Hostilities resurfaced in November of 1984, when Iraqi forces 
crossed the disputed border region and briefly occupied a strip of land. Sovereignty over the 
Kuwaiti islands of Bubiyan and Warbah, which flank Iraq's naval base in Basra, were always a 
bone of contention. Iraq did not only consider the two islands as Iraqi territory, it in fact 
viewed them as crucial protection against Iranian seaborne attack. See THE MIDDLE EAST 
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continued unabated as the Sheikhdom pleaded with its powerful 
neighbor to settle the border problem once and for all. Iraq, however, 
always refused, telling the Sheikhdom that all of Kuwait is Iraq's ter-
ritory. 58 Then came Iraq's now unforgettable invasion of Kuwait on 
August 2, 1990, demonstrating, once again, that Iraq's historic claim 
to Kuwait cannot only be resisted, but also that the underlying ten-
sions must be solved. 59 
III. THE LEGAL DIMENSIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 
SECURITY COUNCIL'S RESOLUTIONS 
At first flush, all the United Nations Security Council's resolu-
tions . adopted in response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 
1990, may appear to be legitimate and proper responses under the 
Charter of the United Nations.60 A closer examination of these reso-
lutions, however, may reveal that several were adopted in the heat of 
the crisis and perhaps under political, military and financial pressures 
from the governments of the United States,61 the United Kingdom62 
219-20 (David R. Tarr & Bryan R. Daves eds., 6th ed. 1986). See also ALBAHARNA, supra 
note 56, at 250 - 57. 
58. See ALBAHARNA, supra note 56, at 250 - 57. 
59. See supra notes 56-57. 
60. On Dec. 14, 1974, the U.N. General Assembly resolved: 
The first use of armed force by a State in contravention of the Charter shall constitute 
prima facie evidence of an act of aggression although the Security Council may, in 
conformity with the Charter, conclude that a determination that an act of aggression 
has been committed would not be justified in the light of other relevant circumstances 
G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 143, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974)[here-
inafter G.A. Res. 3314]. See also U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4. 
61. See Donald Neff, The Bush Initiative, MIDDLE EAST INT'L, Dec. 7, 1990, at 3-4, 
where Neff wrote: 
The cost of 678: 
Beyond the moral depravity caused by Washington's intimate relations with Israel has 
been the cost of keeping the "Gulfbuster" coalition together. How extraordinarily 
manifold these costs are became evident during the past fortnight, as Bush and Baker 
circled the globe in an extraordinary effort to find support for the UN deadline resolu-
tion they ultimately achieved. The concessions Bush was willing to make were quite 
remarkable, ranging from a highly controversial meeting with Syria's President Assad 
in Geneva to receiving China's foreign minister, anathema because of the Tiananmen 
Square massacre . . . . Other Bush concessions involved Baker holding a rare meeting 
with that arch enemy Cuba, supporting the Soviet Union's successful effort to keep the 
Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania out of the Paris peace conference in mid-
November, preparing to approve new emergency food supplies for Romania, allowing 
Turkey a 50 per cent increase in its textile sales to the US market, and encouraging 
Britain to resume diplomatic relations with Syria on 28 November after a four-year 
break. Nor was that all. The benefits for the Soviet Union are proving bountiful too in 
reward for its close cooperation so far in the crisis. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf emirates 
have promised, with US prodding, a $4 billion loan to Moscow, and Bush is now con-
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and perhaps others.63 Thus, these U.N. Security Council Resolutions 
(S.C. Res.) may have been, at the very least, tainted by such pres-
sures64 and their legitimacy rendered doubtful at best. 65 More seri-
ously, they may even have been in violation of the U.N. Charter, the 
very document they purported to comply with and uphold. 66 
sidering waiving laws so that the Soviet Union could receive most favoured nation sta-
tus in receiving US loans and access to US grain and com exports. 
62. See Jules Kagian, The UN, MIDDLE EAST INT'L, Aug. 31, 1990, at 23, where Kagian 
wrote: 
Although the US and Britain maintain that they are empowered anyway to use force 
under Article 51 of the UN Charter (the right of collective and single self-defence) 
following an appeal from the ruler of Kuwait, the adoption of Security Council Resolu-
tion 665 would grant them wider powers and the mandatory cooperation of other coun-
tries. Experts in international law believe that the text of the resolution is vague and 
subject to interpretation. It is noted that the resolution is not strictly based on Article 
42 of the Charter, which allows military measures should Article 41 prove to be inade-
quate. The Soviet Union reluctantly supported the resolution after introducing a 
number of amendments to the original US text. As it stands, the resolution does not 
provide for a unified command or a UN flag. It allows the use of 'measures commensu-
rate to the specific circumstances.' 
63. See Nadim Jaber, Saudia Arabia: Thwarting Peace Bids, MIDDLE EAST INT'L, Dec. 
21, 1990, at 3, where Jaber wrote: 
The new-found assertiveness has also been employed with considerable effect in bring-
ing the Soviet Union into line. Moscow abruptly stopped calling for inter-Arab dia-
logue on the Gulf at around the time it received a $4 billion loan from Riyadh. 
Another $8 bn [sic] is reportedly promised when Gorbachev visits the kingdom next 
month. Saudi influence is also said to be behind the scrapping of a planned meeting last 
week between the Soviet foreign minister and PLO Chairman Y assir Arafat. 
64. See Jules Kagian, The United Nations: Countdown to War or Peace, MIDDLE EAST 
INT'L, Dec. 7, 1990, at 9, where Kagian wrote: 
The UN resolution was the climax of a relentless diplomatic mission undertaken by Mr. 
Baker who travelled 36,000 miles to 12 countries in 24 days meeting 18 foreign minis-
ters. The resolution was supported by 12 of the Council's 15 members. China, one of 
the five permanent members, abstained rather than exercise its veto; Yemen and Cuba 
opposed the resolution . 
. . . It is ironic that while US Congressional leaders are calling for patience to give 
sanctions more time (a year or more), the Council, which imposed the trade embargo, 
has now decided, under US pressure, that 15 January "force" may be used. Iraq's 
ambassador, Abd al-Amir al-Anbari, called the resolution 'an act of aggression' against 
Iraq. He accused the US of arm-twisting to get the resolution through the Council .... 
65. Clearly, the validity of U.N. resolutions cannot be separated from the way they were 
adopted. A U.N. resolution, improperly adopted, may be invalid ab initio. Improper actions, 
such as fraud, bribery, or duress, employed in order to persuade or coerce members of the 
U.N. Security Council to improperly adopt a resolution which would improperly authorize the 
use of force against another state may be considered an act of aggression. See GEORG 
SCHWARZENBERGER, MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 128 -29 (6th ed. 1976). See also A. 
VERDROSS, VOLKERRECHT 146 (3d ed. 1959). Verdross refers to this kind of activity as "a 
clearcut classical example of a force employed against a state contrary to international law 
and, at the same time, a confirmation of the theory of the significance of an illegal force used 
against the state itself." 
66. Article 33(1) of Chapter VI of the U.N. Charter provides: 
The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the mainte-
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For the purposes of this inquiry, I will deal mainly with S.C. Res. 
660, S.C. Res. 661 and S.C. Res. 678. All other U.N. Security Coun-
cil Resolutions relating to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait are directly or 
indirectly connected with these three resolutions. 67 
A. U.N. Security Council Resolution 660 
From the initial stages of the crisis, the U.N. Security Council's 
action did not seem totally measured, 68 as S. C. Res. 660 of August 2, 
1990, was quick to condemn the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait under arti-
cles 3969 and 4070 of the U.N. Charter. United Nations S.C. Res. 660 
also demanded that Iraq withdraw all its forces, immediately and un-
conditionally, to the positions it had held on August 1, 1990. The 
resolution further called on Iraq and Kuwait to begin immediate and 
nance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotia-
tion, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional 
agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their choice. 
U.N. CHARTER art. 33, para. 1 (emphasis added). It is regrettable that the U.N. Security 
Council, perhaps under pressure from the U.S. and the United Kingdom, failed to utilize the 
provisions of Chapter VI of the U.N. Charter. Such utilization may have allowed a peaceful 
resolution of the conflict. 
67. In particular, S.C. Res. 665 gave permission to the states cooperating with the U.S. 
and its coalition partners to use force if necessary to enforce the embargo against Iraq. See 
S.C. Res. 665, supra note 28; ACCESS, supra note 7, at 10. United Nations S.C. Res. 670 
prohibited aircraft from bringing prohibited cargo to Iraq. See S.C. Res. 670, supra note 29; 
ACCESS, supra note 7, at 10. 
68. Article 1 of Chapter I of the U.N. Charter describes the purposes and principles of 
the U.N. as follows: 
To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collec-
tive measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the sup-
pression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by 
peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, 
adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a 
breach of the peace . . . . 
U.N. CHARTER art. 1 (emphasis added). 
69. Article 39 of the U.N. Charter provides: 
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of 
the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what meas-
ures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore inter-
national peace and security. 
U.N. CHARTER art. 39. 
70. Article 40 of the U.N. Charter provides: 
In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, before 
making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, 
call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems 
necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the 
rights, claims, or positions of the parties concerned. The Security Council shall duly 
take account of failure to comply with such provisional measures. 
U.N. CHARTER art. 40. 
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intensive negotiations to resolve their differences. 71 
Politically, members of the U.N. Security Council probably had 
no alternative but to condemn a purported act of unprovoked aggres-
sion 72 by one U .N. member against another and to demand of the 
presumed aggressor immediate and unconditional withdrawal from 
the territory which had been the subject of the claimed aggression. 
By calling on the parties to the dispute, the purported aggressor and 
the claimed aggrieved, to begin immediate and intensive negotiations 
to resolve their ditferences,73 however, the U.N. Security Council 
wisely sought to prevent further aggravation of the situation 74 and to 
allow itself more time to determine that a legally verified act of ag-
gression by Iraq against Kuwait had in fact been committed. 75 
Under article 39 of the U.N. Charter, the Security Council "shall 
determine the existence of any . . . act of aggression and shall make 
71. These differences stem from Iraq's claim that Kuwait is part of Iraqi territory. See 
Elaine Sciolino, Unto Itself: Iraq Yearns/or Greatness, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1990, § 4. They 
also stem from Iraq's claim that Kuwait was waging "economic war" against Iraq. See Wil-
liam Drozdiak, Baker, Aziz Describe Six Hours of Talking Past Each Other, WASH. POST, Jan. 
10, 1991, at A23. 
72. Such condemnation tended to aggravate the situation. It was probably hasty and 
contrary to the letter and spirit of article 40 of the U.N. Charter. See U.N. CHARTER art. 40. 
73. See S.C. Res. 660, supra note 7. See also Crisis in the Persian Gulf: Sanctions, Diplo-
macy and War: Hearings Before the Comm. on Armed Services, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess., 740 
(1990)[hereinafter Crisis](statement of Edward Heath, a member of the British Parliament and 
former Prime Minister). Mr. Heath stated: 
The point I would like to submit to you at the beginning is that paragraph three [ofS.C. 
Res. 660) has from the beginning been completely ignored in the United Nations and by 
the main powers who have forces in the Gulf. The important word in both paragraph 
two and paragraph three is "immediately" . . . because . . . immediately . . . arrange-
ments have got to be made for Iraq and Kuwait to settle their differences . . . by some 
intermediary or international court . . . . If it is true that Kuwait has been stealing 
lands and stealing oil, then there is no reason they should not be made to make it good 
Id. at 740-75. 
74. It was probably too late at that point, however. The premature condemnation of 
Iraq, under pressure from the U.S. and the United Kingdom, with continuous threat to use 
force unilaterally, tended to paralyze the orderly conduct of business in the U.N. Security 
Council. While some members of the Security Council were attempting to take measures to 
ensure the peace from the inception of the crisis, the U.S. and the United Kingdom were 
threatening to use force without Security Council authorization, thereby coercing members of 
the Security Council to take half-baked compromise measures in order to avert further vio-
lence. See Thomas L. Friedman, Allies Tell Baker Use of Force Need U.N. Backing, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 8, 1990, at Al4. 
75. Iraq's main justification for invading, occupying and annexing Kuwait is that Kuwait 
is part of Iraqi territory. See Sciolino, supra note 71 . This is not an uncommon justification 
for the use of force to claim territory. See Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed 
Force, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1620, 1627-28 (1984). 
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recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken . "76 
However, because the U.N. Security Council is a political body and 
not a court of justice, 77 its actions are of necessity political and not 
judicial. While the U.N. Security Council's decision to condemn 
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait may have been unavoidable politically, such 
condemnation was probably premature and perhaps unjustified le-
gally. It would have been justified legally only if it were coupled with 
an advisory opinion by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) that 
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was in fact an act of aggression. This paper, 
therefore, does not presume to examine the political wisdom of the 
U.N. Security Council's resolutions; it will only examine their legal 
propriety. 
On December 14, 1974, the U.N. General Assembly defined ag-
gression as follows: 
Aggression is the use of armed force by a State against the sover-
eignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, 
or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United 
Nations .... 78 
As was stated earlier, Iraq was never adjudicated an "aggressor" 
by the proper U.N. tribunal, the ICJ, which is "the principal judicial 
organ of the United Nations."79 Both the U.N. General Assembly 
and the U.N. Security Council have the authority to "request the In-
ternational Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on any legal 
question. " 80 It is regrettable that no such request was made to the 
ICJ by the U.N. Security Council. By verifying that Iraq had in fact 
committed an act of aggression against Kuwait within the meaning of 
the above legal definition of aggression and allowing the parties to the 
dispute an opportunity to present their claims and counterclaims, it 
would have removed all doubt about Iraq's action and would have 
lent more credence to the condemnation against Iraq embodied in 
S.C. Res. 660. Without such legal verification, however, the condem-
76. See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 l.C.J. 392 (jurisdic-
tion and admissibility of the application opinion of Nov. 26). The ICJ explained that it is an 
essential step to refer a dispute to the U.N. Security Council before submitting the case to the 
court. 
77. The Security Council is designed to address settlements which are primarily of a 
political nature. This does not mean that the Security Council, even when it does not seek the 
aid of the ICJ, operates in isolation from rules of international law, but rather that its primary 
task is to handle the political aspects of a dispute that lie outside the competence of a court of 
law. WESLEY L. GOULD, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 569 (1957). 
78. See G.A. Res. 3314, supra note 60. 
79. U.N. CHARTER art. 29. 
80. U.N. CHARTER art. 96. 
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nation seems unjustifiable, since the issue of "aggression" is a legal 
question, not solely a political one. 81 
Thus, Iraq's claim that Kuwait is part of its territory82 and that 
Iraq's invasion, occupation and annexation of Kuwait were not, there-
fore, in violation of the prohibition on the use of force against the 
territorial integrity of Kuwait, remains unadjudicated in the proper 
organ of the U.N. and, therefore, remains legally unsettled, perhaps 
until the next crisis concerning it erupts. 83 
Iraq, in fact, does appear to have a legitimate claim to the terri-
tory of Kuwait. The assertion that the Sheikhdom has been in control 
of the territory of Kuwait since the tum of the century, enough time 
to defeat Iraq's adverse claim under the principle of prescription ad-
vanced by the Sheikhdom and others, 84 is not supported by historical 
evidence. 85 The territory of Kuwait, in fact, first passed surrepti-
tiously and without Iraqi consent from the Ottoman sphere of influ-
ence to that of the British in 1899, thus, becoming an informal British 
protectorate Sheikhdom, unable to "give for occupation or for any 
other purpose any portion of [the] territory ... without the previous 
consent of Her Majesty's Government .... "86 This and other restric-
tions87 on the Sheikhdom's control of Kuwait's territory continued 
uninterrupted until June 19, 1961.88 Hence, the Sheikhdom had no 
control over the territory of Kuwait until that date, when Great Brit-
ain relinquished its belligerent control. This lack of control by the 
Sheikhdom over the territory of Kuwait until 1961 would seem to 
render the principle of prescription inapplicable in this case, because 
the Sheikhdom's actual control over the territory of Kuwait has lasted 
only thirty years, a relatively short period. 89 When the British gov-
81. See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 l.C.J. 14, 103 - 04 
(June 27)[hereinafter Nicaragua Case]. 
82. See Sciolino, supra note 71. 
83. The ICJ found that the U.S. had violated international law by encouraging several 
specific attacks on Nicaraguan territory. Nicaragua Case, supra note 81, at 146 - 4 7. Subse-
quently, the U.S. denounced the ICJ and continued to support attacks against the government 
of Nicaragua. See Robert Parry & Brian Barger, Reagan's Shadow CIA: White House Ran the 
Secret Contra War, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 24, 1986, at 23. It is doubtful that the U.S. 
would have accepted an ICJ ruling that Kuwait is Iraqi territory. 
84. See Mary E. O'Connell, Enforcing the Prohibition on the Use of Force: The U.N. 's 
Response to Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait, 15 S. ILL. U. L.J. 453, 469 n. 87 (1991). 
85. See supra notes 42-43. 
86. See AITCHISON, supra note 44. 
87. See supra note 43. 
88. See TREVELYAN, supra note 35. 
89. The principle of prescription can never operate unless the territory in question is held 
"for a fairly long time," peacefully, publicly and uninterruptedly. Prescription does not oper-
ate in the event that territory is transferred by treaty. Such a transfer constitutes a simple act 
16
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 18, No. 1 [1992], Art. 7
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol18/iss1/7
1992] United Nations' Role in the Gulf 127 
emment gave up its belligerent control over the territory of Kuwait, 
Iraq immediately laid claim to its usurped territory.90 
More importantly, the principle of prescription can never operate 
unless the original possessor tolerates or acquiesces in the depriva-
tion. 91 Since neither Iraq nor its people, who are the ultimate author-
ity, ever acquiesced or ratified the usurpation of Kuwait, it is, at the 
very least, doubtful that the present Sheikhdom of Kuwait can suc-
cessfully claim the territory of Kuwait by prescription. 
It is true that in 1963 a former Iraqi government for the first time 
recognized the Sheikhdom of Kuwait and established diplomatic rela-
tions with it.92 That recognition, however, was made by an unrepre-
sentative Iraqi govemment93 and was, in fact, neither ratified by an 
Iraqi representative body, nor supported by a popular plebescite.94 
Iraq also claims that during the Iran-Iraq War, when Iraq was 
preoccupied with that war, the Sheikhdom had committed aggression 
when it entered about eighty kilometers inside Iraq and began drilling 
for oil. 95 That Iraqi claim, which merits examination, was never adju-
of cession, which is usually subject to ratification and plebiscite, in order to give effect to the 
principle of self-determination. See 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 434-35, 455-57 
(H. Lauterpacht ed., 5th ed. 1937). 
90. See TREVELYAN, supra note 35. 
91. See 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 89, at 455-57. See also 
CHARLES C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY 
THE UNITED STATES Vol. 1, 192 - 96; GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 140-41 (2d ed. 1949). 
92. See THE PERSIAN GULF STATES, supra note 36, at 67, 175. 
93. Iraq has not had a representative government for decades. Foreign influences have 
shaped its recent history until July 14, 1958 when a group of army officers, led by Brig. Gen. 
Abdul-Karim Kassim, overthrew the Hashemite Monarchy. Ironically, it was a short-lived 
Iraqi Ba'athist dictatorship which recognized the Sheikhdom of Kuwait in 1963, headed by 
Maj. Gen. Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr, as prime minister. That dictatorship ruled for only nine 
months before it was overthrown. Its recognition of the Sheikhdom of Kuwait was never rati-
fied. The Ba'ath party returned to power in 1968, with Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr as president. 
It is an Iraqi Ba'ath government, under Saddam Hussein, which has now reclaimed Kuwait. 
94. See TREVELYAN, supra note 35. 
95. See Iraqi Transcript of Hussein-Glaspie Meeting, reprinted in THE MIDDLE EAST 7th, 
supra note 1, at 375-77. On July 25, 1990, President Saddam Hussein told April Glaspie, U.S. 
Ambassador to Iraq: 
On top of all that, while we were busy at war, the state of Kuwait began to expand at 
the expense of our territory . . . . But go and look for yourselves. You will see the 
Kuwaiti border patrols, the Kuwaiti farms, the Kuwaiti oil installations - all built as 
closely as possible to this line to establish that land as Kuwaiti territory . . . . 
Id. See also Crisis, supra note 73. Edward Heath stated: 
But now the argument is that during the Iranian War, the Kuwaities moved some 60 to 
80 kilometers up into Iraq and the Iraqis were too busy fighting to do anything about it. 
The purpose was to be able to get more oifout of the field which runs under the bound-
ary in Kuwait. The Kuwaities have been siphoning this off at the expense of Iraq. I 
don't know whether this is true or not, but it is a matter that ought to be thrashed out 
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dicated. If it were to be determined by a proper tribunal that the 
Sheikhdom had in fact entered Iraq, then Iraq's action against the 
Sheikhdom may be defended under the legal doctrine of self-defense. 96 
Generally, an act of aggression or military attack must take place 
before self-defense can be justified.97 However, while Iraq was not 
subjected to a military attack by Kuwait, there are perhaps other jus-
tifications for Iraq's actions under international law. 
Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz claimed that "Iraq's action 
was defensive in nature, because Iraq felt threatened by 'economic 
war' from the Sheikhdom's policies, which were driving down oil 
prices and bankrupting Iraq."98 This legal issue was not adjudicated 
by the proper U .N. tribunal. 99 
The definition of aggression does not specifically mention eco-
nomic pressure. However, the 1952 Report on the Question of De.fin-
by debate, discussion, by experts and by some intermediary or international court .... 
We have international problems which were mentioned in the first resolution of the 
United Nations as having to be resolved, and you are absolutely justified in carrying on 
negotiations to resolve them. If it is true that Kuwait has been stealing lands and steal-
ing oil, then there is no reason they should not be made to make it good, otherwise you 
are sanctioning theft by a sovereign country during a time when its neighbors are en-
gaged in war. 
Id. at 744, 775. 
96. The international law doctrine of self-defense has been distinguished from aggression, 
provided it is based on actual necessity, as opposed to a sham or pretense to justify the use of 
force. Before resorting to self-defense with the use of force, however, a state is expected to use 
peaceful procedures. Furthermore, the action of self-defense must be proportional to the origi-
nal offense. See w. THOMAS MALLISON & SALLY v. MALLISON, THE PALESTINE PROBLEM 
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD 0.RDER 296 - 97 (1986). 
97. See Diana Vincent-Daviss & Radu Popa, The International Legal Implications of 
Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait: A Research Guide, 23 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & PoL. 231 (1990). 
98. See Drozdiak, supra note 71. See also Iraqi Transcript of Hussein-Glaspie Meeting, 
THE MIDDLE EAST 7th, supra note 1, at 375 (held on July 25, 1990). President Hussein told 
April Glaspie, U.S. Ambassador to Iraq: 
Id. 
Iraq came out of the war burdened with $40 billion debts . . . . We began to face the 
policy of the drop in the price of oil . . . . But when planned and deliberate policy forces 
the price of oil down without good commercial reasons, then that means another war 
against Iraq. Because military war kills people by bleeding them, and economic war 
kills their humanity by depriving them of their chance to have a good standard of living 
. ... Kuwait .. . [was] at the front of this policy aimed at lowering Iraq's position and 
depriving its people of higher economic standards . . . . 
99. Although neither Iraq nor Kuwait seems to have declared "that they recognize as 
compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement" the jurisdiction of the ICJ, under article 
36 of the Statute of the International Court, the ICJ "may give an advisory opinion on any 
legal question at the request of whatever body may be authorized by or in accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations to make such a request." See Statute of the International Court 
of Justice, art. 65, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055. 
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ing Aggression 100 maintains that unilateral action to deprive a state of 
the economic resources derived from the fair practice of international 
trade, or to endanger its basic economy, is a form of aggression. 101 
As far back as 1954, the International Law Commission, in pur-
suance of a U.N. General Assembly resolution, judged intervention in 
another state's internal or external affairs by means of economic or 
political coercion in order to "obtain advantages of any kind" to be an 
"[o]ffense against the peace and security of mankind ... for which 
responsible individuals shall be punished."102 Economic pressure has 
never been accepted as justifiable grounds for the use of military force 
under the doctrine of self-defense. Yet, this is a developing area of 
international law which the ICJ would have had an opportunity to 
examine had the case been brought before it. 
Additionally, Iraq has claimed that a group of Kuwaitis seeking 
to overthrow Kuwait's unrepresentative Sheikhdom had invited Iraq 
to invade Kuwait and liberate it from the grip of a corrupt and feudal-
istic regime. 103 Under the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, a 
state may have the right to use force against another sovereign to pro-
tect its inhabitants from inhumane treatment by their governing sov-
ereign.104 This claim should also have been examined more closely 
and adjudicated by the International Court of Justice. 
As a matter of record, the U.S. Department of State has recently 
issued its annual country reports on human rights practices and has, 
in fact, taken the Sheikhdom of pre-invasion Kuwait to task for its 
feudalistic and unrepresentative structure and, above all, for its gross 
human rights abuses. •os 
Not only did the Sheikhdom of Kuwait restrict "freedom of as-
100. O'Connell, supra note 84, at 472 n.105 (citing U.N. Doc. A/2211, at 58, quoted in L. 
HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW 688 (2d ed. 1987)). 
101. Id. 
102. See Report of the International Law Commission, U.N. GAOR, 9th Sess., Supp. No. 
9, U.N. Doc. A/2693 (1954). 
103. See John K.ifner, Iraq Proposes Peace Talks, then Lashes Out at the U.S., N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 22, 1990, at A9. 
104. See Michael J. Bazyler, Reexamining the Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention in 
Light of the Atrocities in Kampuchea and Ethiopia, 23 STAN. J. INT'L L. 547, 547-48 (1987); 
Laura K. Wheeler, The Grenada Invasion: Expanding the Scope of Humanitarian Intervention, 
13 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L.R. 413, 415-17 (1985). 
105. See COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1990: REPORT SUB-
MITTED To THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, U.S. SENATE, AND THE COMMIT-
TEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 
1507-21(February1991)[hereinafter THE REPORT]. See also COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1991: REPORT SUBMITTED To THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RE-
LATIONS, U.S. SENATE, AND THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS HOUSE OF REPRE-
SENTATIVES BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE (February 1992). 
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sembly and speech," it denied its citizens the right "to change their 
government" by peaceful means. 106 The Sheikhdom was character-
ized by "arbitrary arrest, mistreatment of prisoners, and lack of due 
process in its trials." 107 The Emir, "always a descendent of al-Sabah 
family/' 108 had dissolved Kuwait's National Assembly and "had 
ruled by decree," 109 thus imposing "censorship on the press" 110 and 
"restrictions on the political and civil rights of all Kuwaiti resi-
dents." 111 The Sheikhdom of Kuwait had also engaged in acts of 
"torture," according to the Department of State. 112 The report states 
that prior to the invasion of Kuwait, the Sheikhdom had engaged in 
"physical violence in apprehending and interrogating" 113 a number 
"of prominent Kuwaiti opposition leaders,"114 some of whom were 
ex-parliamentarians, charging them with participating in "unlicensed 
activities." m In pre-invasion Kuwait, "political parties were 
banned"116 by the Sheikhdom and the police were often sent to citi-
zens' homes to "arrest vocal opposition" to the Sheikhdom's rule. 117 
Iraq's claim, therefore, that it invaded Kuwait at the invitation of 
the Sheikhdom's oppressed opposition should not have been taken 
lightly and dismissed out of hand. 118 Furthermore, the claim of inva-
sion by invitation is not an Iraqi invention. Both the former Soviet 
Union and the U.S. have used the claim to justify recent invasions, the 
106. THE REPORT, supra note 105, at 1507, 1509-11, 1516-17. The Report actually gave 
a disturbing account of the conduct of the Sheikhdom prior to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. It 
would seem odd that the government of the United States would make the fuss it did about 
rescuing a Sheikhdom with a record of oppression and lack of representation it already knew 
about. Instances of arbitrary arrest, mistreatment of prisoners, lack of due process, abuse of 
women and workers and torture actually border on the barbaric, according to the Department 
of State account. 
107. Id. at 1507. 
108. Id. 
109. THE REPORT, supra note 105, at 1507. 
110. Id. 
111. Id. 
112. Id. at 1509. 
113. THE REPORT, supra note 105, at 1509. 
114. Id. at 1510. 
115. Id. 
116. Id. at 1513. 
117. THE REPORT, supra note 105, at 1513. 
118. Iraq's hands in the area of human rights are not exactly clean, however. 
Iraq's abysmal record of repression of human rights was even more flagrant in 1990 
. . . . Iraq flaunted the Fourth Geneva Convention on Civilians and other established 
norms of civilized behavior by arbitrarily detaining hundreds of foreign civilians in both 
Iraq and Kuwait . . . . Almost every category of human rights dealt with in this report 
is severely restricted or nonexistent in Iraq . . . . 
Id. at 1457. 
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Soviet Union in its invasion of Afghanistan119 and the U.S. in its inva-
sion of Grenada. 120 
Iraq, however, did not claim that its invitation had come from a 
properly installed government, 121 but from an oppressed group within 
a territory Iraq claims to be its own. 122 In view of the Sheikhdom's 
oppressive and undeniably unrepresentative regime, Iraq's claim may 
very well have been justified under the doctrine of humanitarian inter-
vention. At the very least, it merited adjudication. 123 
Because none of Iraq's claims, all of which seem to contain legal 
issues, had been presented to the ICJ for an advisory opinion or for 
adjudication, the legal propriety of S.C. Res. 660, which condemned 
Iraq for its invasion of Kuwait, remains in doubt. 
B. U.N. Security Council Resolution 661 
If I am correct in concluding that the condemnatory part of S.C. 
Res. 660124 was prematurely adopted125 and that it was, therefore, le-
gally unsupportable, 126 it would then seem that S.C. Res. 661, 127 
which was based on S.C. Res. 660, was automatically without legal 
119. See The Russians Reach the Khyber Pass at Last, THE EcONOMIST, Jan. 5, 1980, at 
25. 
120. See Say Something, If Only Goodbye, THE EcoNOMIST, Mar. 10, 1984, at 31. 
121. As a general rule, even invitations by governments have been regarded as suspect. 
See O'Connell, supra note 84, at 463 n. 63. 
122. See Lewis, supra notes 5; MIDDLE EAST 7TH, supra note 1, at 355. 
123. Ironically, it is the government of the U.S. which advocates intervention in order to 
depose unrepresentative governments. See O'Connell, supra note 84, at 472-75. Yet it is this 
very intervention which brought it the condemnation of the U.N. General Assembly by a vote 
of 108 to 9, for its invasion of Grenada in 1983. See U.N. GAOR, 38th Sess., 43 plen. mtg., at 
45, U.N. Doc. A/38/PV. 43 (prov. ed. 1983). This policy also brought the U.S. condemnation 
for its invasion of Panama. The Effects of the Military Intervention by the United States of 
America in Panama on the Situation in Central America, G.A. Res. 44/240, 44th Sess., U.N. 
Doc. A/Res/44/240 (1989). The ICJ has of course characterized U.S. activities in Nicaragua 
as "aggression." See Nicaragua Case, supra note 81. 
124. See ACCESS, supra note 7. 
125. See text supra part III.A. and accompanying notes. 
126. See text supra part III and accompanying notes. 
127. United Nations S.C. Res. 661, among other things, required the following sanctions 
to be imposed against Iraq and Kuwait: 
(a) A ban on imports of Iraqi or Kuwaiti origin, exported from these areas after the 
date of the resolution. 
(b) A prohibition on acts of member states' nationals, or within their territories, in 
promotion of the export or transshipment of any commodities or products from Iraq or 
Kuwait, including dealing in such commodities or products, and the transfer of funds 
to Iraq or Kuwait for the purpose of such activities. 
(c) A prohibition on the sale or supply of any commodities or products to any person 
or body in, or for the purpose of carrying on any business in or operated from, Iraq or 
Kuwait, or the promotion of such prohibited activities, except that these prohibitions 
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foundation because sanctions, economic and financial, should only be 
the consequence of a legally determined act of aggression. 128 
Under domestic law in the U.S., the state usually exacts a fine 
from an offender or it may imprison him. If the offense is extreme, 
such as the unjust taking of a life, the state may even impose corporal 
or capital punishment. This is because the criminal sanction is re-
garded as a payment to the national society, rather than to the injured 
party. The offense itself is regarded as one against the national soci-
ety. An accused under these circumstances, however, is presumed in-
nocent until he is proven guilty and is given a fair trial, by which his 
constitutional right to due process of law is guaranteed. 129 
Economic or financial sanctions, whereby the U.N. attempts to 
disrupt the commercial and financial activities of a member state and 
its nationals, are such severe measures that they should never be im-
posed on a member state without affording that member "due process 
of law."130 These sanctions are a relatively new form of reprisal. 
They are not intended to be a payment to the international society as 
in the case of a legally proven domestic offense. They are an extreme 
did not apply to "supplies intended strictly for medical purposes, and, in humanitarian 
circumstances, foodstuffs;" and, 
(d) A prohibition on the provision of funds "or any other financial or economic re-
sources" to the Government of Iraq or to any commercial, industrial or public utility 
undertaking in Iraq or Kuwait, by the member states or their nationals or any person 
within their respective territories, except that the prohibition does not apply to pay-
ments "exclusively for strictly medical or humanitarian purposes, and, in humanitarian 
circumstances, foodstuffs. 
S.C. Res. 661, supra note 18. The Resolution even went so far as to call upon members and 
non-members of the U.N. to break existing contracts, with Iraq, in order to strengthen the 
implementations of the sanctions. At the same time it kept an important role for the Security 
Council to oversee the proper execution of the sanctions. Id. On its face, such a request is 
most likely illegal. 
128. Chapter VII, articles 39-51 of the U.N. Charter are the main authority for the impo-
sition of sanctions. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 39-51. The essential element, however, is that 
this drastic coercive measure must be used legally and responsibly and not at the whim of one 
powerful or inftuential state or group of states in order to advance their special interests. As 
former Senator J.W. Fulbright once wrote: "The crucial distinction is not between coercion 
and voluntarism, but between duly constituted force, applied through law ... and the arbitrary 
coercion of the weak by the strong." J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT, THE CRIPPLED GIANT 108 
(1972). For an analysis of the existing sanctioning process under Chapter VII of the U.N. 
Charter, see MYRES s. McDoNALD & FLORENTINO 0. FELECIANO, LA w AND MINIMUM 
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 261-383 (1961). See also MALLISON & MALLISON, supra note 96, at 
419-24. 
129. U.S. CONST. amend. v. For a general discussion see WAYNER. LAFAVE, MODERN 
CRIMINAL LAW (2d ed. 1988). 
130. See H. Lauterpacht, The Boycott in International Relations, 1933 BRIT. Y. B. INT'L 
L. 125. See also GEORGE A. FINCH, THE SOURCES OF MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW 44-58 
(1937). See also text supra part III. 
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and coercive measure, designed to force a state which has been legally 
adjudicated to have committed an act of aggression to behave in a 
manner dictated by the international community, through the organ 
of the U.N.131 
Because of the severity of economic and financial sanctions and 
the hardships they can bring to the innocent nationals of an accused 
state, they should not be imposed lightly.132 If they are imposed 
against a state which has not committed a legally determined act of 
aggression under intemational law133 or against one whose "aggres-
sion" has been determined summarily and without "due process of 
law," 134 then these sanctions themselves might be illegal acts13s and 
might not be supported by article 42 of the U.N. Charter.136 Mem-
bers of the U.N. may not be bound to comply with them. 137 
Thus, the imposition of sanctions by the U.N. Security Council, 
in and of itself, does not make that imposition legal. 138 In fact, the 
U.N. Security Council's role in the Gulf Crisis fell far short of gaining 
the character of legality, 139 which tended to undermine the moral au-
thority of the U.N. 140 Just as a state can violate its own constitution, 
so too can members of the U.N. Security Council collectively violate 
the U.N. Charter, thus rendering a collective decision of that body 
illegal.141 
Regrettably, this appears to be the course of action taken by the 
131. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 36, 39-51. While article 41 authorizes the Security Council 
to use "measures not involving the use of armed force to be employed" in order "to give effect 
to its decision," the Security Council, before making a decision, is under an obligation to refer 
legal disputes "to the International Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of the 
Statute of the Court" under article 36(3) of the U.N. Charter. 
132. See text supra part III. 
133. See Nicaragua Case, supra note 81, at 103-04. 
134. See FULBRIGHT, supra note 128. See also McDONALD & FELECIANO, supra note 
128, 261-383; MALLISON & MALLISON, supra note 96. 
135. The severe imposition of economic and financial sanctions should not be the product 
of a hasty or coerced political action, but should be a reaction to a deliberated and properly 
adjudicated legal determination by the International Court of Justice. Because the Security 
Council itself is not a court of law and Iraq was never adjudicated as an aggressor by the U.N. 
Court, the Security Council seems to have exceeded its authority by imposing economic sanc-
tions against Iraq. See GOULD, supra note 77. 
136. See text supra part II and accompanying notes. 
137. See text supra part III.A. and accompanying notes. 
138. See GOULD, supra note 77, at 597; Nicaragua Case, supra note 81. 
139. See supra notes 61-65 and the accompanying text. 
140. See Neff, supra note 61. 
141. In order to avoid illegal Security Council action, the Security Council should have 
referred the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait to the International Court of Justice, as it did in the 
Corfu Channel Dispute, and as advocated in article 36(3) of the U.N. Charter. See GOULD, 
supra note 77. 
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U.N. Security Council. It imposed unprecedently harsh economic 
and financial sanctions against Iraq for its clumsy effort to restore to 
its control a vital part of its territory which had been stolen from Iraq 
and governed by an unrepresentative Sheikhdom. 
C. U.N. Security Council Resolution 678 
On November 29, 1990, the U.N. Security Council, acting under 
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, "adopted" S.C. Res. 678, by a vote 
of 12-2, with Cuba and Yemen against, and China abstaining. 142 
It is doubtful that S.C. Res. 678 was in fact properly and legally 
adopted by the U.N. Security Council, in view of the abstention 
rather than a concurrence by China, one of the five permanent mem-
bers of the U.N. Security Council. China's abstention must have been 
legally fatal to the proper adoption of the resolution under article 27 
of the U.N. Charter, which provides: "Decisions of the Security 
Council . . . shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members 
including the concurring votes of the permanent members . . . . " 143 
United Nations S.C. Res. 678 provided that: 
(1) Iraq should comply fully with S/RES/660 (1990), and all subse-
quent resolutions; 
(2) Member states cooperating with the Government of Kuwait are 
authorized to use all necessary means to uphold and implement Reso-
lution 660 ( 1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to re-
store international peace and security in the area, if Iraq does not on 
or before 15 January 1991 fully implement all the relevant resolutions 
pertaining to its invasion, occupation and annexation of Kuwait; 
(3) All states should provide appropriate support for actions under-
taken pursuant to this resolution; 
(4) The states concerned should keep the Security Council regularly 
142. S.C. Res. 678, supra note 31. ACCESS, supra note 7, at 16. 
143. In his address to the Security Council, Qian Qichen, China's Foreign Minister, 
stated: 
[T]he United Nations, as the international organization for the maintenance of peace 
and security, is responsible both to international security and to history. It should act 
with great caution and avoid taking hasty actions on such a major question as authoriz-
ing the member states to take military actions against another member state . . . . [I]n 
this draft resolution ... the wording "use all necessary means" is used, which in essence 
permits the use of military actions. This runs counter to the consistent position of the 
Chinese Government - namely, to try our utmost to seek a peaceful solution. There-
fore, the Chinese delegation has difficulty voting in favor of this draft resolution .. .. 
Mideast Tensions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1990, at AlO. Commenting on China's abstention, 
Louis Jay Herman, in a Letter to the Editor of The New York Times, wrote: "Thus a draft 
resolution is killed just as effectively by an abstention as by a negative vote or 'veto' ... [of a 
permanent member of the U.N. Security Council]. See Louis Jay Herman, Legal Fiction Oils 
U.N. ~Iraq Resolution, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1990, at A38. 
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informed on the progress of actions taken pursuant to this 
resolution. 144 
In effect, S.C. Res. 678 was an ultimatum issued to Iraq by the 
U.N. Security Council. It stated that unless Iraq complied with all 
the U.N. Security Council resolutions pertaining to Iraq's invasion, 
occupation and annexation of Kuwait by January 15, 1991, certain 
U.N. members would use "all necessary means," interpreted by these 
states to mean force, 14s to coerce Iraq to implement these 
resolutions. 146 
Yet article 2 of the U.N. Charter requires all members of the 
U.N. to "settle their international disputes by peaceful means"147 and 
to "refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of 
force" 148 which, in effect, is the issuing of ultimatums. The Charter of 
the U .N. seems to seek the avoidance of the indiscriminate use of 
force or the threat to use force, in an effort to prevent extortion under 
the guise of compelling respect for legal rights. 149 
On its face, therefore, S.C. Res. 678 would seem to violate article 
2 of the U.N. Charter and the norms of international law, if the 
phrase "all necessary means" were to be interpreted, as the U.S. and 
144. See S.C. Res. 678, supra note 31. 
145. Secretary of State James Baker, in addressing the members of the Security Council, 
during deliberations on S.C. Res. 678, stated: 
Our aim today must be to convince Saddam Hussein that the just and humane demands 
of this Council, and of the international community, cannot be ignored. If Iraq does 
not reverse its course peacefully, then other necessary measures, including the use of 
force, should be authorized. We must put the choice to Saddam Hussein, in unmistaka-
ble terms. 
Mideast Tensions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1990, at AlO. 
146. This is not the first time in which the U.S. played the dominant role in producing 
U.N. resolutions allowing it to use force against another state which attempted to retake part 
of its claimed territory. In 1950, when North Korea invaded South Korea, the U.S., utilizing 
the unexpected absence of the Soviet Union from the U.N. Security Council, succeeded in 
obtaining U.N. Security Council authority to use U.S. force in the Korean War, under U.N. 
flag, terming such use of force "police action." During the Korean War in 1950, the Soviet 
Union blocked further action by the U.N. Security Council. The U.S., however, succeeded in 
having the U.N. General Assembly adopt the famous Uniting for Peace Resolution on Novem-
ber 3, 1950, by more than the two-thirds majority required by article 2(3) of the U.N. Charter. 
See G.A. Res. 377, U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 20, at 10-12, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1954). 
This resolution allowed the U.S. to conduct military action in Korea under U.N. flag. See also 
British Back U.S. on Korea Stand,· French Doubt Adequacy of Help, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 
1950, at Al, where it is reported that the European allies of the U.S. were of the opinion that 
the U.N. actions in Korea were in fact U.S. actions. 
147. U.N. CHARTER art. 2(3). 
148. U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4). 
149. See SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 65, at 128 - 29. 
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its coalition partners had obviously already done, to include the use of 
force or the threat to use force. 
It is significant, however, that S.C. Res. 678 had not specifically 
authorized the use of force. In the past, when the Security Council 
called for the use of military force to restore international peace, it 
made its position clear, not ambiguous or subject to interpretation. 150 
Yet, had it specifically done so here, that would have been a blatant 
violation of the U.N. Charter and might even have prompted Soviet 
and possibly Chinese vetoes. This is because the use of force by indi-
vidual states is not permitted under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. 
Force under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter could be used only 
under a U.N. force, pursuant to articles 46151 and 47152 of the U.N. 
Charter. In this connection, it is important to note that at a very 
early stage of the crisis the Soviet Union announced that it would only 
participate in the use of force in the Gulf if all the forces were under 
U.N. command, pursuant to Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. l53 
Article 51 of Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, however, does not 
150. As part of the U.N. response to the North Korean's invasion of the South in 1950, 
the U.N. Security Council issued several resolutions. See JOSEPH M. SWEENEY ET AL., THE 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 1305-11 (3d ed. 1988). In s.c. Res. 84 issued on July 7, 
1950, the Security Council recommended that "all [U.N.] Members providing military forces 
and other assistance ... make such forces ... available to a unified command." S.C. Res. 84, 
para. 3, U.N. SCOR, 5th Sess., 476th mtg. (July 7, 1950) reprinted in SWEENEY, id. at 1307-08 
(emphasis added). 
151. Article 46 of the U.N. Charter provides: "Plans for the application of armed force 
shall be made by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee." 
U.N. CHARTER art. 46. 
152. Article 47 of the U.N. Charter provides: 
1. There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the 
Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council's military require-
ments for the maintenance of international peace and security, the employment and 
command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible 
disarmament. 
2. The Military Staff Committee shall consist of the Chiefs of Staff of the perma-
nent members of the Security Council or their representatives. Any Member of the 
United Nations not permanently represented on the Committee shall be invited by the 
Committee to be associated with it when the efficient discharge of the Committee's 
responsibilities requires the participation of that Member in its work. 
3. The Military Staff Committee shall be responsible under the Security Council 
for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security 
Council. Questions relating to the command of such forces shall be worked out subse-
quently. 
4. The Military Staff Committee, with the authorization of the Security Council 
and after consultation with appropriate regional agencies, may establish regional sub-
committees. 
U.N. CHARTER art. 47. 
153. See ACCESS, supra note 7, at 8. See also Nanda, supra note 4, at 440-41. 
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"impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence . . . 
until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain 
peace and security ... . " 1s4 It is doubtful that the use of force against 
Iraq could be successfully defended under the provisions of this Chap-
ter VII article. This is because the U.N. Security Council had already 
taken the "necessary measures to maintain peace and security" by 
imposing economic and financial sanctions against Iraq, 1ss illegal 
though these sanctions might have been, 1s6 thus preempting the use of 
force under the pretext of self-defense. Hence, the use of force by the 
U.S. and its coalition partners against Iraq, by necessity, has to be 
characterized as "a first use of force." 1s7 It is this "first use of force" 
which the U.N. Security council had obviously sought to avoid au-
thorizing. Had it done so, specifically authorizing the use of force by 
individual members of the U.N. against Iraq, the U.N. Security Coun-
cil would have been guilty of an unprecedented and flagrant violation 
of the U.N. Charter.1ss 
Despite the clearly conscious decision of the U.N. Security 
Council to deny individual members of the U.N. specific authority to 
use force against Iraq,1s9 the U.S. and its coalition partners utilized 
S.C. Res. 678, employed massive air and naval forces and attacked 
Iraq on January 16, 1991.160 Such attack was not sanctioned by S.C. 
Res. 678 and was probably a violation of the U.N. Charter and of the 
norms of international law. 
The attack against Iraq was not sanctioned by the provisions of 
S.C. Res. 678. This Resolution clearly and deliberately denied indi-
vidual members of the U.N. specific authority to use force against 
Iraq, since the U.N. Security Council itself probably felt that it did 
not have the authority to do so under the circumstances of the con-
flict. 161 The use of force against Iraq could have been authorized only 
154. Article 51 of the U.N. Charter further provides: 
Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immedi-
ately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and 
responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time 
such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace 
and security. 
U.N. CHARTER art. 51. 
155. See text supra part 111.B. and accompanying notes. 
156. See id. 
157. See O'Connell, supra note 84, at 475, n. 123. 
158. See supra notes 142-44 and accompanying text. 
159. Id. 
160. See Gordon, supra note 33. 
161. See supra notes 142-44. 
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under U.N. command and U.N. force, pursuant to article 42162 of 
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. It is nonetheless significant that in 
more than forty days of constant and massive air and naval bombard-
ment against Iraq, the U.S. and its coalition partners, who had de-
clared that S.C. Res. 678 authorized them to liberate Kuwait by force, 
did not use the initial force to liberate Kuwait, but to destroy Iraq. 163 
The attack against Iraq was a violation of the U.N. Charter. Ar-
ticle 2 of the Charter calls on all members of the U.N. to "settle their 
international disputes by peaceful means" and to "refrain in their in-
ternational relations from the threat or use of force against the territo-
rial integrity or political independence of any state .... " 164 
The attack against Iraq was a violation of the norms of interna-
tional law because the massive use of force by the U.S. and its coali-
tion partners against Iraqi cities, infrastructure, industry and 
civilians16s was ample proof that neither a good faith effort to liberate 
Kuwait, nor a good faith effort to find a solution to the conflict, was 
the main purpose of the attack. The main purpose of the attack 
seemed to be the total destruction of Iraq. 166 Hence, there was not the 
slightest effort on the part of the U.S. and its coalition partners to 
adhere to the international law doctrine of proportionality .167 Adher-
ence to this doctrine is usually required when a state or group of 
states use force under the principle of collective self-defense, which 
the U.S. and its partners invoked as justification for their attack 
against Iraq168 pursuant to article 51 of the U.N. Charter.169 
162. See U.N. CHARTER art. 42. 
163. See Thomas L. Friedman, What the United States has Taken on in the Gulf, Besides 
A War, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1991, § 4. Friedman wrote: "The goal is to render Iraq unable to 
project power beyond its borders for years to come." Id. 
164. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4. 
165. See MIDDLE EAST w ATCH, NEEDLESS DEATHS IN THE GULF WAR: CIVILIAN 
CASUALTIES DURING THE AIR CAMPAIGN AND VIOLATIONS OF THE LAWS OF WAR (1991). 
166. See Gordon, supra note 33. 
167. "Proportionality means putting a stop to the provocation, not taking revenge." See 
O'Connell, supra note 84, at 480. See also Schachter, supra note 75, at 1637-38. 
168. See Paul Lewis, U.S. Preparing U.N. Draft on Claims Against Baghdad, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 1, 1990, at A12. This is not the first time that the U.S. has invoked the principle of 
"collective self-defense" to justify a military attack against another state. It used it to justify 
its campaign against Nicaragua. But by a vote of 12 to 3, the l.C.J. rejected the U.S. claim of 
collective self-defense and ruled that the U.S. campaign against Nicaragua was an act of ag-
gression in violation of international law. The l.C.J. also ruled that the U.S. trade embargo 
against Nicaragua was in violation of U.S. obligations under its own Treaty of Friendship, 
Commerce, and Navigation with Nicaragua. The U.S., however, dismissed the ruling. When 
Nicaragua went to the U.N. Security Council for a resolution demanding compliance with the 
l.C.J.'s judgment, the U.S. vetoed the resolution. Nicaragua then appealed to the U.N. Gen-
eral Assembly which passed a resolution by a vote of 94 to 3, with 47 abstentions. The U.S. 
continued to refuse to abide by the l.C.J.'s decision, however. See JEFFREY LAURENTI, A 
28
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 18, No. 1 [1992], Art. 7
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol18/iss1/7
1992] United Nations' Role in the Gulf 139 
The doctrine of proportionality is: 
but one specific form of the more general principle of economy in 
coercion and as a logical corollary of the fundamental community 
policy against change by destructive modes. Coercion that is grossly 
in excess of what, in a particular context, may be reasonably required 
for conservation of values against a particular attack, or that is obvi-
ously irrelevant or unrelated to this purpose, itself constitutes an un-
lawful initiation of coercive or violent change. 170 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The use of force for the settlement of disputes, even if it is legally 
defensible, is rarely politically or morally justifiable. It is always risky 
militarily. 
Iraq's use of force to repossess the territory of Kuwait, which 
belonged to it historically, but which was usurped from it illegally and 
unjustifiably, was no doubt unwise politically and militarily. It was at 
best morally doubtful. 
Instead of resorting to the use of force to recover its stolen terri-
tory, Iraq would have been well advised to submit its claim to Ku-
wait for arbitration or for adjudication before the International Court 
of Justice. 171 
The use of force against Iraq by the U.S. and its coalition part-
ners, under color of authority from the U.N. Security Council, has 
also been unwise. More seriously, however, it has been morally and 
legally indefensible. It has wreaked near total destruction on Kuwait 
and Iraq, far exceeding the purported authority which allowed the use 
of force. Instead of resorting to the use of force, the U.S. and its 
partners should have utilized the U.N. to find a peaceful solution, in 
accordance with the U.N. Charter and the norms of international law. 
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the international crisis it gener-
ated, also demonstrated, regrettably, that the U.N. is a weak intema-
STRONGER HAND: SHAPING AN AMERICAN AGENDA FOR A MORE EFFECTIVE UNITED NA-
TIONS 25 (1988). However, recently Nicaragua withdrew the case from the ICJ on September 
26, 1991. See Discontinuance by Nicaragua of Case against the United States, 86 AM. J. INT'L 
L. 173 (1992). 
169. See U.N. CHARTER art. 51. 
170. See McDONALD & FELECIANO, supra note 128, at 243. See also MALLISON & 
MALLISON, supra note 96. 
171. A discussion of an ICJ case between Iraq and Kuwait is beyond the scope of this 
paper which addresses only advisory opinions. The viability of such a suit will be addressed by 
the author in a forthcoming paper. 
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tional body, lacking the strength and resourcefulness to manage 
serious international conflicts peacefully and responsibly. 
The demise of the Cold War in the wake of the Soviet Union's 
internal economic and political collapse, has further weakened the 
United Nations. Absent the Cold War, the U.N. is deprived of the 
tacit but fragile system of checks and balances which was derived 
from this long-standing polarization of the great powers. By default, 
the U.S. has become the only military and economic power to guide 
the course of the U.N. 
Practically unchallenged when the Gulf Crisis erupted, the U.S. 
could not rise to the occasion. Instead, it only managed, through an 
unprecedented scheme of bribery, coercion and manipulation, to get a 
series of legally questionable resolutions "adopted" by the U .N. Se-
curity Council. These tactics provided political justification for it and 
for its coalition partners to launch a disproportionately massive and 
merciless attack against Iraqi cities, infrastructure, industry and civil-
ian population. This infraction was a violation of the U.N. Charter 
and of the norms of international law and served to undermine the 
moral and legal stature of the international organization. 
A sober, clear-thinking and representative Iraqi government 
could bring the U.S. and its coalition partners to the International 
Court of Justice, as Nicaragua has done, to account for the violent 
destruction of Iraq and for the infliction of starvation and disease 
upon millions of Iraqi civilians. It is also conceivable that those re-
sponsible for this wanton and indiscriminate activity could be charged 
individually with crimes against humanity. The present Iraqi regime 
could also be held to account for a series of illegal acts, including the 
seizure of innocent foreign civilians in Kuwait and in Iraq. 
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